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Abstract Policy interventions that increase insurance coverage for infertility treat-
ments may affect fertility trends, and ultimately, population age structures. However,
such policies have ignored the overall impact of coverage on fertility. We examine
short-term and long-term effects of increased insurance coverage for infertility on the
timing of first births and on women’s total fertility rates. Our main contribution is to
show that infertility mandates enacted in the United States during the 80s and 90s did
not increase the total fertility rates of women by the end of their reproductive lives.
We also show evidence that these mandates induced women to put off motherhood.
Keywords Assisted reproductive technologies · Infertility insurance mandates ·
Completed fertility · Delay of motherhood · Synthetic control method
JEL Classification I18 · J13
1 Introduction
The average age at first birth in the United States has been rising steadily over the past
decades, from 21.49 in 1968 to 23.72 in 1985 and 25.26 in 2004. As shown in Fig. 1,
this increase has been accompanied by remarkable changes in the age distribution of
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Fig. 1 Distributions of maternal age at first birth in 1968 and 2004
first-time mothers, which has become less skewed with a substantially higher density
of first-time mothers older than 25 and an extension of first-time motherhood beyond
the age of 40.
Women, however, face a biological time constraint on bearing children because
fecundity decreases with age. The introduction of and the subsequent increase in the
use of assisted reproductive therapies (ARTs) have helped women in extending their
reproductive lives (CDC 2007). ARTs, particularly in-vitro fertilisation (IVF), are
very expensive procedures. For example, in 1992, a birth from an IVF procedure cost
between 44,000 and 211,942 USD (Neumann et al. 1994). Over time, however, ART
patients have faced substantially lower costs due to increased competition (Hamilton
andMcManus 2012), a reduced number of cycles due to better technology,1,2 andmost
importantly, the availability of insurance in both the United States and in Europe.3
In this paper, we analyse whether easier access to ARTs induces women to delay
motherhood and whether, in the long term, it affects women’s completed fertility by
the end of their reproductive lives.
The perception that ARTs increase fertility has led the European Parliament to call
onmember states to insure ‘the right to universal access to infertility treatment’ (Ziebe
and Devroey 2008). This movement’s incarnation in the United States has sponsored
several attempts at approving the ‘Family Building Act of 2009’, which would extend
coverage for infertility treatments, and the enactment by several states of infertility
1 A cycle is the process that starts with the administration of fertility medication to stimulate a woman’s
ovaries to produce several follicles. Fertilization may occur in the laboratory (IVF) or in the womb.
2 See, for example, the evolution of success rates in the 2005 CDC assisted reproductive technology (ART)
report at http://www.cdc.gov/art/PDF/508PDF/2005ART508.pdf.
3 In Europe, some countries such as Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Israel, Slovenia, and Sweden have
complete public coverage for infertility treatment (IFFS 2007). The case of the United States is examined
in this paper.
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insurance coverage laws, which are referred to as infertility treatment mandates.4
Considering the high cost of infertility treatments (Bitler and Schmidt 2012; Collins
2001), policy interventions that grant insurance coverage for infertility treatments may
affect fertility trends and ultimately, population age structures. The mid- to long-term
consequences of ARTs are central to the European debate on possible solutions to
an ageing population—i.e., can ARTs be part of a package of policies intended to
increase fertility rates in Europe? (Grant et al. 2006; Ziebe and Devroey 2008).5
The answer is complex because the short-term effect of an increase in coverage
for infertility treatments may be very different from the long-term effect. In the short
term, an increase in the aggregate fertility rate is expected due to an increase in fertility
amongst the least fertile women (a compositional effect). Typically, these are relatively
old women who delayed motherhood and would be unlikely to conceive otherwise
(Buckles 2005; Schmidt 2005a, 2007). Moreover, increased access to ARTs increases
the frequency of multiple births in the population (Bundorf et al. 2007). These two
effects are short-term and non-strategic andmay be referred to as ex-postmoral hazard.
In the long term, however, easier access to infertility treatments and the possibility of
extending reproductive life may induce women to further delay motherhood, possibly
because of overly optimistic perceptions about the effectiveness of infertility treat-
ments (Lampi 2006; Benyamini 2003). This response by relatively young women,
which may be referred to as ex-ante moral hazard, is strategic and would increase the
average age at first birth for several years after the policy was implemented.6 Such a
response would be consistent, for example, with the delay in marriage due to increased
infertility coverage documented in Abramowitz (2014). Therefore, it is possible that
an increase in insurance coverage for infertility treatment may have negative effects on
total fertility in the mid- to long-term. This paper examines these issues in the United
States, where, by 2001, more than 1 % of live births were due to IVF (CDC 2007).
Our objective in this paper is twofold. First, we analyse the impact of an increase
in infertility insurance on the timing of first births. Although this question was first
explored by Buckles (2005), we believe that our paper contributes in a substantial way
to the few existing manuscripts that address this topic by using more adequate data
and methodology. Moreover, we go a step further by looking into the long term effects
of increasing infertility insurance. Second, we ask whether the increase in infertility
insurance affects completed fertility, i.e., fertility by the end of awoman’s reproductive
4 Direct evidence of the impact of infertility coverage mandates on ART utilisation is provided by Bitler
and Schmidt (2012), who show that the self-reported use of infertility treatments increases among highly
educated older women, and byMookim et al. (2008), who use the mandates a an instrument for ARTs usage
using data on medical claims. Indirect evidence of the impact of infertility insurance on ART utilisation
is provided, among others, by studies showing an increase in multiple births among white women (Bitler
2005; Bundorf et al. 2007) and a higher prevalence of unhealthy twins (Bitler 2005).
5 The total fertility rate for the 25 countries in the European Union is only 1.5 births per woman (Ziebe
and Devroey 2008).
6 The terms ‘ex-ante’ and ‘ex-post’ moral hazard are common in the Health Economics literature; while
the latter is typically associated with demand responses to price changes, the former is associated with
changes in behaviour that affect the probability of disease or need for medical attention. In consequence,
an increase in the usage of ART in response to a price reduction due to a larger availability of insurance
may be referred to ex-post moral hazard, while changes in behavior such as postponement of motherhood,
which increases the likelihood of usage of ARTs in the future, may be referred to as ex-ante moral hazard.
123
410 SERIEs (2015) 6:407–439
life. This study represents, to the best of our knowledge, the first to address this issue.7
Both objectives are analysed using data from the United States.
To assess whether infertility insurance induces a delay in motherhood, one needs to
combine evidence about reduced fertility of young women with information on when
women become mothers, i.e., when (if at all) they stop delaying motherhood. This
precisely describes the approach we adopt in the first part of this paper; we not only
offer similar evidence as Buckles (2005) on the reduced probability that relatively
young women in mandated states have children, but we also demonstrate that the
average age of first-time mothers continues to increase in the medium to long term
after the enactments of infertility mandates.8 Our long-term estimate (10–16 years
after the first and the last mandates were passed) ranges from 3 to 5 months. These
effects are substantial insofar as they represent between 15.7 and 18.8 % of the total
increase in the age of first-time mothers during the period considered for the group of
six states that enacted infertility treatment mandates9 and between 24.8 and 34.3 %
for the three states with the most generous coverage (Illinois, Massachusetts, and
Rhode-Island).10
The ageing of first-time mothers may impact women’s completed fertility in the
long term. Hence, our second goal is to determine whether infertility insurance indeed
increases women’s completed fertility by the end of their reproductive lives, a question
that has not been addressed in the existing literature. In principle, any potential negative
effects on fertility induced by a delay of motherhood may eventually be offset by
a higher prevalence of multiple births,11 so the impact of infertility insurance on
completed fertility is ultimately an empirical question. Overall, our estimates, based
on data on the number of biological children from the June CPS, show no statistically
significant effect of either the strong or the comprehensive mandates on completed
fertility.
In sum, our paper shows that, despite being associatedwith higher birth rates among
relatively older women and with a higher prevalence of multiple births, infertility
insurance does not have a statistically significant effect on women’s fertility at the end
7 Although researchers paid attention to differential impacts on current and completed fertility in the 1980s
(e.g.,Ward andButz 1980), we are not aware of any other paper addressing the effects of infertility insurance
on women’s completed fertility.
8 For the first exercise, we construct the probability of having a biological child by the age of 30 using data
from the June Marriage and Fertility Supplement of the Current Population Survey (the ‘June CPS’). For
the second exercise, we combine birth certificate data from the National Vital Statistics with data from the
March Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey (the ‘March CPS’) and
apply the synthetic control group method (Abadie et al. 2010), which relies on more general identifying
assumptions than the standard difference-in-differences model typically used in the literature.
9 These results refer to a set of six states that enacted what is usually labeled as “strong-to-cover” infertility
mandates, defined in Sect. 2. They are: Arkansas, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Rhode
Island.
10 In an independent work concurrent with our own, Ohinata (2011) offers an alternative to Buckles (2005)
based on the estimation of a duration model for age at first birth using longitudinal data from the panel study
of income dynamics (PSID). She finds a substantial delay of motherhood of approximately 1.5–2 years.
Ohinata’s identification is, however, based on a relatively small number of women.
11 The prevalence of multiple births is approximately 31 % in ART cycles using fresh non-donor eggs or
embryos (CDC 2007) compared with slightly more than 3 % in the rest United States population.
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Table 1 Infertility treatment mandates classifications
State Cover/offer Mandatory Application Marriage
IVF coverage required
Arkansas Cover-strong (1987) Yes HMOs excluded Yes
California Offer (1989) No All plans No
Connecticut Offer (1989) Yes HMOs excluded No
Hawaii Cover-strong (1987) Yes All plans Yes
lllinois Cover-strong (1991) Yes All plans No
Maryland Cover-strong (1985) Yes All plans Yes
Massachusetts Cover-strong (1987) Yes All plans No
Montana Cover-weak (1987) No HMOs only No
New York Cover-weak (1990) No HMOs excluded No
Ohio Cover-weak (1991) No HMOs only No
Rhode-Island Cover-strong (1989) Yes All plans No
Texas Offer (1987) Yes All plans Yes
West Virginia Cover-weak (1977) No HMOs only No
Cover strong are indicated in bold
Sources: Buckles (2005), Schmidt (2007) and theNational InfertilityAssociation (http://www.resolve.org/).
Louisiana and New Jersey enacted infertility mandates in 2001, but these states were excluded from our
analysis
of their reproductive lives. The reason lies, as we further show, in the fact that infertility
insurancemandates also appear to delaymotherhood among relatively youngerwomen
and, hence, make conception more difficult because fecundity decreases with age.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 describes the characteristics
of infertility treatment mandates including where and when they were enacted; Sect. 3
describes the data sources used in this paper; Sect. 4 presents our evidence on the delay
of motherhood; Sect. 5 presents an analysis of the impact of the mandates on women’s
completed fertility; Sect. 6 presents conclusions; Sect. 7 contains figures and tables;
and Sect. 8 is the “Appendix”.
2 Infertility treatment mandates
Table 1 summarises the major features of infertility insurance mandates and their
timing. The classification of mandates is consistent with those presented in Buckles
(2005) and Schmidt (2007). Mandates can either require mandatory coverage of infer-
tility treatment for all plans (‘mandates to cover’) or demand that employers offer
at least one plan that covers infertility treatment (‘mandates to offer’). In addition,
mandates to cover are described as ‘strong’ when they cover IVF treatment and at
least 35% of the women are affected by the mandate; otherwise they are described
as ‘weak’.12 According to the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, of the
12 The classification of mandates as being ‘strong’ versus ‘weak’ is not universal, although it is broadly
consistent with the classifications used in the literature and is adopted here for convenience. In contrast to
Schmidt (2007), Buckles (2005) cites Ohio as having a non-IVF coverage mandate.
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six states classified as ‘mandate-to-cover-strong’, only Arkansas does not apply the
mandate to all plans (HMOs are exempt). In addition, out of the six strong mandate
states, three require women to be married to benefit from the insurance coverage (see
Mookim et al. 2008 for more detail on mandates).
Other authors, such as Hamilton and McManus (2012), Bundorf et al. (2007), and
Mookim et al. (2008), classify Illinois, Massachusetts, and Rhode-Island (hereafter
IL-MA-RI) as having ‘universal’, ‘comprehensive’, and the ‘most comprehensive cov-
erage’, respectively. In this paper, the effects of infertility treatment mandates on this
specific group of states are also analysed.
Concerns about policy endogeneity have been discussed in previous studies, such as
Bitler and Schmidt (2012) and Hamilton and McManus (2012). The latter two studies
in particular reached the conclusion that the enactment of infertility treatmentmandates
was largely the result of the efforts of a national infertility association (RESOLVE)
and the political rather than fertility preferences of state residents. We briefly revisit
this issue in our sample in Sect. 4.1.
The “Appendix” describes state-specific changes made to the original strong man-
dates in later periods. Because most of the revisions that occurred within the sample
period (i.e., before 2001) undercut benefits, they are expected to decrease the estimated
effects of the mandates.
3 Data sources
Our data comes from three main sources: (1) birth certificates from the National Vital
Statistics System of the National Center for Health Statistics; (2) the March Annual
Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey (March CPS) and
(3) the JuneMarriage and Fertility Supplement of the Current Population Survey (June
CPS).13
In Sect. 4.1, we use individual-level data from the June CPS to analyse the impact
of the mandates on the probability of having a child by the age of 30/35. The period
of analysis is restricted to 1979–1995 due to the unavailability of the main dependent
variable beyond that period.
In Sect. 4.2, we aggregate individual-level data from birth certificates on the age of
new mothers at the state and year level to analyse the impact of the mandates on the
age at first birth. The birth certificates contain individual records for 50 % of the births
occurring within the United States from 1968 to 1971; from 1972 to 1984, the data are
based on 100 % samples of birth certificates from some states and on 50 % samples
from the remaining states; as of 1985, the data cover every birth from all reporting
areas.14 These data also contain information on themother, including her age, race and
state of residence as well as specific information about the timing, parity (whether the
birth was a first or subsequent birth), and plurality (the number of children per delivery
13 We downloadedMarch CPS data and documentation from the IPUMS-USA database (King et al. 2010),
while we used processed June CPS files from Unicon Research Corporation (http://www.unicon.com).
14 Births occurring to US citizens outside the United States are not included. The number of states from
which 100 % of the records are used increased from 6 in 1972 to all states and the District of Columbia in
1985. We adjusted the total numbers accordingly in the analysis.
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that is, whether it was a single, twin, triplet, or higher-order birth) of each birth. This
information allows the identification of first births and, therefore, the determination
of the average age of new mothers, which is the main variable of interest in Sect. 4.2.
When multiple births occur, only one observation per delivery is kept in our sample
to avoid oversampling multiple-birth mothers, who are more likely to be older and/or
to have used ARTs.15
The birth certificate data also contain other potentially relevant socioeconomic
variables, such as marital status and maternal education, but the information is not
always complete or available throughout the sample period.16 Thus, for the multi-
variate analyses in Sect. 4.2, we combine the aggregate state and year level birth
certificate information on the age of new mothers with a richer set of socioeconomic
characteristics obtained from the March CPS, including race, education, marital and
labour market status, wages, and health insurance coverage. Note that controlling for
employment-sponsored health insurance coverage is important in this context given
that uninsured individuals are not directly affected by the mandates and that most
non-elderly insured individuals in the United States obtain insurance through their
workplace.17
Our analysis in Sect. 4.2 could, in principle, be conducted until 2005, when state
identifiers become unavailable in the natality files. However, we restrict our sample to
the period before 2001 (i.e., from 1972 to 2001) so that Louisiana and New Jersey can
be included as controls (these two states passed infertility insurance laws in 2001).
Including Louisiana and New Jersey in the treated group would not have provided us
with sufficient post-intervention years to analyse the long-term impact of these latest
mandates.Moreover, because stateswere not uniquely identified in theCPS until 1977,
the controls from the March CPS are only included from 1977 onwards. The period of
analysis, unless otherwise stated, is 1972–2001, inclusively. To further enrich the set
of control variables, state-year legal abortion rates by 1000 women aged 15–44 and
state of residence obtained from The Guttmacher Institute are included.
15 We uniquely identify multiple-birth mothers by using, whenever available, various variables, such as the
year, month and day of birth, the gestation time, the state, county and place or facility of birth, the presence
of an attendant at birth, plurality; maternal age, race, years of schooling, marital status, the place of birth,
the state, county, city, and standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) of residence; and paternal age and
race.
16 Importantly, information on maternal education is missing for the following states and years: California
(1972–1988), Alabama (1972–1975), Arkansas (1972–1977), Connecticut (1972), the District of Columbia
(1972), Georgia (1972), Idaho (1972–1977), Maryland (1972–1973), New Mexico (1972–1979), Pennsyl-
vania (1972–1975), Texas (1972–1988) and Washington (1972–1991). Marital status is not reported in any
state until 1978.
17 An important feature of state-mandated benefits is that self-insured employers are exempt from state
insurance regulations under the 1974 Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Hence,
employers who self-insure are exempt from the requirements of the state infertility insurance mandates
previously described. Because self-insured companies are typically large, the impact of the mandates is
likely to be concentrated on small firms. Lacking information on the self-insured status of employers,
researchers have used firm size as a proxy for ERISA exemptions (e.g., Schmidt 2007 and the references
therein, Simon 2004; Bhattacharya and Vogt 2000). Self-reported firm-size from the March CPS could be
used as a proxy for ERISA exemption status, but this variable was not recorded before 1988 and therefore
could not be included as a predictor in our estimations.
123
414 SERIEs (2015) 6:407–439
Finally, in Sect. 5, we again use data from the June CPS to estimate the effects of
the mandates on completed fertility using information for 1979–2000 as well as for the
extended period 1979–2008 as a robustness check. Unlike the March CPS data, which
is available on a yearly basis and only provides information on the presence of children
in the household without discriminating between biological and non-biological chil-
dren, the June questionnaire is not administered every year but contains information on
the number of biological children ever born. In particular, the June CPS provides this
information for the following years during our sample period: 1979–1985, 1990–1992,
1994–1995, 1998, and 2000.18 Additionally, the June CPS contains information on
other potential determinants of fertility, such as age, marital status, and labour market
status, which we incorporate as controls in the regressions. An important handicap of
both the June and March CPS questionnaires for our purposes is that only information
about the current state of residence is given and not, for example, information on the
birth state of a child.
4 The effect of infertility treatment mandates on the delay
of motherhood
In this section, we provide evidence that infertility insurance mandates cause a strate-
gic delay of motherhood.We start in Sect. 4.1 by showing that relatively youngwomen
are less likely to have children after the mandates. Although this exercise is similar to
Buckles’ (2005), we use more adequate data and a different empirical specification.
The premise in Buckles (2005) is that insurance for infertility treatment allows women
to postpone motherhood and invest in their careers.19 Buckles uses the enactments of
mandates to cover infertility treatment in several states of the United States during the
late 1980s and 1990s as natural experiments and reports that the mandates increased
the probability that relatively oldwomen (40–49) would have young children.We refer
to this non-strategic response as a short-term compositional effect or as ex-post moral
hazard.20 Additionally, Buckles (2005) shows that the mandates reduced the proba-
bility that relatively young women (22–26 and 26–30) would have young children.
Showing a decrease in the probability of having children while young, however, falls
short of proving delay because it fails to consider what these women do when they
grow older. Indeed, these women could decide to remain childless. To demonstrate
delay, one needs to combine this evidence with evidence of the timing of first-time
motherhood, i.e., when (if at all) women decide to become mothers and stop delay-
ing motherhood. This is exactly what we do in Sect. 4.2. The idea is as follows: if
young women postpone childbearing because of the mandates, then we should see
18 In 1977, 1986, 1987, and 1988, the ‘number of babies’ question was also asked but only to women who
had ever been married. The question is most often posed to women in their childbearing years, which in the
June CPS typically included women ages 18–44. Including women aged 45–49 would limit the analysis to
the years 1979, 1983, 1985, and 1995, leaving us with very few post-intervention periods.
19 In a very recent paper Kroeger and La Mattina (2015) revisited the link between infertility treatment
and career develoment.
20 Other papers providing evidence in favour of a non-strategic effect are Schmidt (2005a, 2007) and Bitler
and Schmidt (2012).
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an increase in the average age at first birth several years after the policies are imple-
mented. We compute the average age of first-time mothers at the state-year level from
birth certificate data and show that mandates not only increase the average age in
the short-run—consistent with a compositional effect—but, more importantly, that
the first motherhood age-gap relative to the counterfactual increases with time since
enactment—consistent with a behavioural effect. The counterfactual in this exercise
is constructed using the synthetic control method recently developed by Abadie et al.
(2010) (henceforth ADH), which exhibits several advantages over the conventional
DID estimator. The ADH methodology is explained in Sect. 4.2 in detail.
4.1 The probability of having a first child by 30 and 35 years of age
In this section, we estimate the effect of time since the enactment of a mandate on the
probability of having at least one biological child by the ages of 30 and 35 using the
June CPS data.
Table 2 presents the estimated marginal effects from probit estimations of the num-
ber of years of mandated coverage at age 30 on the probability of having at least one
biological child by that age. In all regressions, women are, by definition, older than
30. The first four columns show the marginal effects for all strongly treated states,
whereas the last four columns show the marginal effects for IL-MA-RI. Each set of
four columns is further split between the effects for ‘all’ women and the effects for
‘whites’ only. Finally, the table presents the results of regressions where the con-
trol group is composed of all non-treated states (columns labelled ‘control’) and of
regressions where the control group is restricted to the states belonging to the synthetic
control group constructed in Sect. 4.2 with the ADH methodology (columns labelled
‘synth’; see the note to Table 2 for a complete list of states in this control group).21
Panel A shows the marginal effects when the independent variables of interest are year
intervals since enactment by the age of 30, i.e., ‘1–5’ and ‘6–10 years’. Panel B shows
the marginal effects when the independent variable of interest is instead expressed as
a quadratic polynomial of years since enactment by the age of 30. In a given state and
year, the number of years of mandated coverage by 30 varies by women according
to age. For example, a woman from Maryland who turned 30 before 1985 had zero
years of mandated coverage by 30; a woman from Maryland who turned 30 in 1990
had 5 years of mandated coverage at age 30 but would have had 10 years of mandated
coverage by 30 had she turned 30 in 1995. Therefore, the coefficient on the variable
‘1–5 years of mandated coverage at age 30’ is being identified by relatively older
women, while the coefficient on the variable ‘6–10 years of mandated coverage at age
30’ is being identified by the younger cohorts. Additionally, note that because states
enacted their mandates in different years, the number of years of mandated coverage
by a certain age is not collinear with age (e.g., a woman who experienced 5 years
of mandated coverage by age 30 in Illinois would be 6 years younger than a woman
from Maryland with the same duration of coverage by age 30). A large set of controls
21 We thank an anonymous referee for proposing to use the states belonging to the synthetic control group
of Sect. 4.2 as the control group for the results in this section as well.
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are included in all regressions, such as state fixed effects, year fixed effects, educa-
tional attainment dummy variables (viz., high school, beyond high school), working
status, married status, and age dummy variables in 5-year intervals. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level.
The results in Panel A of Table 2 show that having a strong or comprehensive
mandate enacted by age 30 for 1–5 years is associated with a higher probability of
having at least one child before age 30, and this effect is statistically significant for
the strong mandates (‘whites’ sample) and for the comprehensive mandates (both
for ‘all’ and for ‘whites’). As noted above, the 1–5 years effect is identified by the
relatively older cohorts, who did not act strategically and who increased their fertility
due to the mandates. This result, which is consistent with that of Bundorf et al. (2007),
is suggestive of a moral hazard effect among relatively fertile couples.22 However,
facing a strong or comprehensive mandate by the age of 30 for longer than 6 years is
associated with a lower probability of having a biological child by 30. The marginal
effects for ‘6–10 years’ are identified by the relatively younger cohorts, and, hence,
constitute evidence of strategic delay. The magnitudes of these marginal effects are,
as expected, larger for IL-MA-RI and are generally statistically significant. Moreover,
the marginal effects are not small in magnitude, as they imply a reduction of 2.9–3.3
percentage points (pp) in the probability of having a child by age 30 for all women
(representing a decrease of 4.2–5 % in the average probability of the treated presented
at the bottom of Table 2) and between 1.1 and 2.2 pp for white women (or a decrease
of 1.7–3.4 % in the average probability of the treated presented at the bottom of
Table 2).
The fit obtained with the quadratic polynomial specification (Panel B) is essentially
identical to the one obtained in Panel A, as can be observed from the values of the log-
likelihood. The marginal effects of the mandates are now consistently negative when
evaluated at 5 and 10 years after their enactment and are always statistically significant,
except for the strong-mandates ‘all’-women sample. The quadratic specification also
delivers more intuitive results; for example, the effect for ‘whites’ is always larger
than the effect for ‘all’. The magnitudes of the marginal effects evaluated at 10 years
are also quite large, especially for the strong-mandates ‘whites’ sample as well as for
the comprehensive mandates.
Ageneral concernwith policy evaluation studies basedonnon-experimental designs
is the possibility that such studies are flawed because the adoption of policies is often
endogenous. This would be the case if, for example, the enactment of infertility treat-
ment mandates was linked to low fertility or to a systematic pattern of motherhood
delay. As briefly explained in Sect. 2, the endogeneity of the infertility treatment man-
dates is rejected by several authors (Bitler and Schmidt 2012; Hamilton andMcManus
2012; Abramowitz 2014). Nonetheless, because our approach and variables are dif-
ferent from theirs, we assess the extent to which endogeneity might be an issue in our
own data. Similar to Bitler and Schmidt (2012), we have included leads of the mandate
variables in our analysis of the probability of at least one child by age 30. In particular,
we have experimented with a linear measure of ‘years to enactment of mandate’ as
22 An anonymous referee suggested an alternative explanation where some low fertility couples can con-
ceive very quickly after IVF.
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well as with indicator variables for ‘future mandate’ together with indicator dummies
for 1–3 or 1–5 years to the enactment of the mandates (these results are not displayed
for the sake of brevity). None of these variables is statistically significantly different
from zero.
Finally, Table 3 reports the marginal effects of the probability of having at least one
child by age 35. The results displayed show that most marginal effects are not statis-
tically significantly different from zero, indicating that delay is no longer statistically
significant by the age of 35.
Our estimations, although similar, offer some advantages over those of Buckles
(2005). First, our dependent variable does not suffer from two important shortcomings
present in her indicator ‘own children younger than six present in the household’. Her
variable, constructed from the March CPS, does not distinguish between biological
and non-biological children, and its universe is restricted to children who live in the
household. To construct our variable, we use data from the June CPS on biological
children ever born. Second, in our case, the relevant number of years since themandates
is measured at age 30, and all women in the sample are, by definition, older than 30.
Buckles (2005), uses the number of years since themandates at the timeof the interview
in a sample which includes women who were children—as young as 8-year-old—at
the time the mandates were enacted. Her linear specification forces the coefficients
on the interaction terms between the years since the mandates and age to be close to
zero and not significant because a 22-year-old woman who experiences a mandate for
14 years, for example, is hardly more affected than a 22-year-old who has only been
under a mandate for 2 years. Unfortunately, our approach comes at a cost: the variable
from the June CPS used to construct the dependent variable used in the regressions
of Tables 2 and 3 was not recorded beyond 1995, thereby restricting the estimation of
the effects of the mandates to the medium run.23
Using the March CPS proxy ‘age of own eldest child in the household’, which was
recorded until 2008, to increase the number of available periods would be unlikely
to bias the results for relatively young women (whose children have not yet left the
household and whose probability of adoption is smaller), but it would likely bias the
results for older women whose eldest child has already left the household. Indeed,
the latter could be wrongly classified as having zero children by the ages of 30/35.
Moreover, older women are also more likely to have zero years of mandated coverage
by 30/35 (the omitted category in the regressions of Panel A). Consequently, using the
March CPS data would imply mistakenly assigning less relative fertility by age 30/35
to older women who have had less exposure to the mandates by the age of 30 or 35,
causing an upward bias in the estimated effect of the number of years of coverage on
the probability of having at least one child by ages 30/35. Buckles (2005) estimates of
23 To construct the variable ‘at least one child by age x’, where we use x = 30 and x = 35 years of age,
we need to know the age at which each woman had her first child. We obtain this information from the
June CPS variable ‘birth1y’, which reports the year of birth of the first child. Unfortunately, this variable is
not recorded every year and is not available beyond 1995. Moreover, for the years 1990, 1992, and 1995,
‘birth1y’ contains many missing values, although they are evenly spread across all states. The number of
missing values for ‘birth1y’ is approximately 53 and 55 % for the control and the strongly treated states,
respectively.
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Table 3 Marginal effects of infertility insurance mandates on the probability of having at least one child
by age 35
Strong states IL-MA-RI
All Whites All Whites
Control Synth Control Synth Control Synth Control Synth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: years of mandated coverage
1–5 years −0.0230∗ −0.0221∗ −0.0198 −0.0202 −0.0199 −0.0174 −0.0164 −0.0135
(0.0120) (0.0132) (0.0137) (0.0140) (0.0176) (0.0187) (0.0171) (0.0176)
6–10 years −0.0127 −0.0094 −0.0033 −0.0055 0.0043 0.0073 0.0160 0.0161
(0.0100) (0.0117) (0.0149) (0.0163) (0.0151) (0.0168) (0.0102) (0.0111)
Pseudo R2 0.117 0.126 0.131 0.143 0.119 0.137 0.131 0.162
Log-lik. −24,769 −12,335 −21,091 −10,144 −23,465 −8,859 −20,247 −7,028
Panel B: quadratic polynomial specification
Evaluated at 5
years
0.0010 0.0014 0.0028 0.0023 0.0017 0.0014 0.0041 0.0030
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0027) (0.0026)
Evaluated at 10
years
0.0120 0.0121 0.0158 0.0148 0.0105 0.0081 0.0154 0.0113
(0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0119) (0.0108) (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0123) (0.0116)
Pseudo R2 0.117 0.126 0.131 0.143 0.118 0.137 0.131 0.162
Log-lik. −24,770 −12,336 −21,091 −10,144 −23,466 −8,860 −20,248 −7,029
No. of obs 67,618 32,008 57,953 26,506 63,971 23,273 55,498 18,805
P treated 0.766 0.761 0.743 0.738
Results from Probit estimation. The dependent variable is 1 if a woman has at least one child by age
30 and zero otherwise. In Panel A, the independent variables of interest are dummies of year-intervals
(e.g. 1–5 and 6–10 years) since the mandates were enacted by the age of 35. In Panel B, the independent
variable of interest is a quadratic polynomial of the number of years since enactment by the age of 35.
Sample years: 1979–1983, 1985, 1990, 1992, 1995. The age range is 35–44 both inclusive. Control group
in columns labeled “control” is composed of all non-treated control states. Control group in columns labeled
“synth” i.e. columns (2), (4), (6) and(8) is restricted to states used to construct the Synthetic Control Group
in Sect. 4.2. of the paper. Hence, in col. (2) control states are Alaska, Arizona, District of Columbia,
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont
andWisconsin. In col. (4), control states are Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia,Michigan,Minnesota,
Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. In col. (6), control
states are Alabama, Alaska, District of Columbia, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Utah,
Vermont and Wyoming. In col. (8), control states are Colorado, District of Columbia, Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, Utah, Vermont andWyoming. All regressions control for year dummies, state fixed
effects, education variables (high-school, more than high-school), working status, unmarried status and
age dummies. Regressions for all women also include race dummies. “P treated” stands for the average
probability of at least one child before 35 among the treated. Levels of statistical significance: *** denotes
significance at the 1-% level; ** at the 5-% level; and * at the 10-% level. Standard errors are robust and
clustered at the state level
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the probability of the ‘presence of small children in the household’ for older women
(Table 4 of her paper) are likely to suffer from this bias.
It is important to recognise that the June and March CPS data share a shortcoming
due to the lack of information on past states of residence. This limitation would be
problematic if women with infertility issues were more likely to travel to mandated
states to pay lower prices for infertility treatments. Abramowitz (2014) claims that
this is unlikely because interstate migration during 1981–2010 was only 3 %, and
mandated states in general had lower immigration than non-mandated states. Finally,
some readers may wonder whether the welfare reform enacted in 1996 [the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA)] affects or biases our results;
therefore in the “Appendix”, we explain why it does not.
4.2 Average maternal age at first birth
We begin this part of the analysis by providing some descriptive evidence that broadly
characterises the patterns of fertility timing across groups of states and over time.
Figure 2a–c plot the evolution of the average age of new mothers in control states
versus all treated states, all strongly treated states, and IL-MA-RI (the states with
‘comprehensive coverage’), respectively. The two vertical lines in each figure indicate
the years in which the first and last of the corresponding mandates were passed for all
of the treated states (1977; 1991), for the strongly treated states (1985; 1991) and for
IL-MA-RI (1987; 1991). Although the average age of first-time mothers was higher
in treated states than in control states even before any mandate was enacted, Fig. 2b,
c show that, for states with ‘strong mandates to cover’ and for IL-MA-RI, the treated-
control gap became larger after the passage of the mandates. For example, in 2001, the
age gap between IL-MA-RI and the control states was slightly more than 16 months,
that is, nearly 4months longer than in 1991, the year in which the latest strongmandate
passed in Illinois.24
More interestingly, from the viewpoint of this paper, the observed increase in the
treated-control gap is statistically significant at standard levels of testing, which sug-
gests that the effect of the mandates is larger in the long run than in the short run.25
The observed treated-control gap follows an analogous pattern, and its magnitude
is similar, albeit somewhat larger, when the sample is restricted to white mothers.26
It is also worth noting that the increasing trend that we have documented is not so
24 These 4 months account for 33 % of the overall increase in the age of new mothers that occurred in
IL-MA-RI between 1991 and 2001. Although this relative magnitude is purely descriptive, the fact that it
is so large further motivates our subsequent analysis.
25 In particular, we regressedmaternal age at first birth for the period 1972–2001 frombirth certificates from
the National Vital Statistics System dataset on a set of state and year fixed effects and on indicators of the
number of years passed since themandateswere enacted in themother’s state of residence. Subsequently, we
tested whether the effect of the number of years since the passage of mandates was statistically significantly
larger in the long run than in the short run. Our results indicate that this was indeed the case for the ‘strong
mandates to cover’ and the ‘comprehensive mandates’. See Machado and Sanz-de-Galdeano (2011) for a
more detailed discussion of these results.
26 These results are available in an earlier working paper version of this article (Machado and Sanz-de-
Galdeano 2011).
123
422 SERIEs (2015) 6:407–439
Table 4 Means of predictors used in synthetic control group estimation for maternal age at first birth
States with Control group
Strong
coverage
Synthetic Control states
% married women (1982–1984) 0.52436 0.52577 0.55883∗∗∗
Abortion rate (1978–1982) 29.1949 31.8491∗∗∗ 24.4055∗∗∗
% white females (1982–1984) 0.81651 0.81951 0.84786∗∗∗
% white females (1977–1981) 0.82268 0.82580 0.85711∗∗∗
% black females (1981–1984) 0.13906 0.14113 0.13267∗∗
% black females (1977–1980) 0.13639 0.13620 0.12836∗∗∗
% highly-educated women (1982–1984) 0.36872 0.36441 0.31839∗∗∗
% highly-educated women (1977–1981) 0.31365 0.31367 0.28049∗∗∗
Female employment rate (1982–1984) 0.61664 0.61537 0.59480∗∗∗
Female participation rate (1977–1984) 0.64740 0.64819 0.63591∗∗∗
Previous year female log hourly wage (1982–1984) 1.95119 1.94975 1.84945∗∗∗
Previous year female employment rate (1983–1984) 0.65491 0.65574 0.64217∗∗
Previous year female employment rate (1977–1982) 0.63055 0.62794 0.62046∗∗∗
% of women covered by ESI in own name (1982–1984) 0.34135 0.36550∗∗∗ 0.33498
Maternal age at first birth, 1984 23.9426 23.9471 23.3413∗∗∗
Maternal age at first birth, 1982 23.5474 23.5310 22.9629∗∗∗
Maternal age at first birth, 1981 23.3371 23.3320 22.7918∗∗∗
Maternal age at first birth, 1979 22.9212 22.9489 22.4131∗∗∗
Maternal age at first birth, 1977 22.6122 22.6055 22.0579∗∗∗
Maternal age at first birth, 1976 22.4229 22.4288 21.8879∗∗∗
Maternal age at first birth, 1975 22.2059 22.2042 21.6589∗∗∗
Maternal age at first birth, 1974 22.0984 22.0898 21.5136∗∗∗
Maternal age at first birth, 1973 21.9157 21.9237 21.3490∗∗∗
Maternal age at first birth, 1972 21.8149 21.8108 21.2541∗∗∗
% of new mothers age >35 (1981–1983) 0.02131 0.02164 0.01516∗∗∗
% of new mothers age >35 (1977–1980) 0.01396 0.01436∗∗ 0.00978∗∗∗
Treatment group composed of new mothers in strong coverage states
Columns (1) and (2) are obtained directly from the synthetic group estimation routine. Column (3) was
added for comparison. The control group in column (3) is composed of all control states. The predictors
obtained from the Natality data are: “Maternal age at first birth 〈YEAR〉” and the “Mean percent of new
mothers age >35 〈YEAR INTERVAL〉”. All the other predictors are obtained from the March CPS data.
The sample used for the predictors from the March CPS are women between 15- and 49-year-old. Each
predictor variable is averaged for the period(s) indicated. ESI stands for employment sponsored health
insurance. Composition of the synthetic control group varies with the sample and can be checked in the
notes of the following tables
evident when all of the thirteen treated states are considered together (Fig. 2a). The
reason lies in the much more limited scope of the ‘weak mandates to cover’ and
the ‘mandates to offer’, described in Sect. 2. Interestingly, visual inspection of Fig.
2 indicates that the treated-control gap may have been increasing even before the
mandates were enacted, especially for IL-MA-RI. Although this evidence is merely
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Fig. 2 Average maternal age at first birth. All women
descriptive, it highlights the importance of selecting a control group that success-
fully mimics the dynamics of the treated states to estimate the true impact of the
mandates.
To construct a control group that maximises the similarities between women in
treated and control states, we use the synthetic control method (Abadie et al. 2010)27
which benefits from several advantages over the conventional DID estimator. The
synthetic control group approach limits the discretion of researchers in the choice of
the control units by offering a procedure for the construction of an ‘ideal’ control group
denoted as the ‘synthetic’ control group. The synthetic control group uses a weighted
average of the potential control units,which provides a better counterpart for the treated
units than any single actual control unit or set of actual control units. The weights
assigned to each control unit are chosen to minimise the differences in pre-treatment
trends and other predictors between the treated unit and the synthetic control group.
This estimation procedure is very transparent because it reports the estimated relative
contribution, which may be zero, of each control unit to the synthetic group. It is worth
noting that, although the synthetic control group approach is obviously related to the
standard DID estimator, which it extends, the synthetic control group approach also
has features in common with matching estimators insofar as both approaches attempt
to minimise observable differences between the treatment and control units. Indeed,
some of the latest developments in the literature attempt to minimise the chances of
27 See Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) for an earlier application of the synthetic control group approach.
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selection into treatment based on unobservables.28 The synthetic control approach is
a step in this direction because it relies on more general identifying assumptions than
the standard DID model, allowing the effects of unobserved variables on the outcome
to vary with time.
To apply the synthetic control group, the birth certificate data on the age of new
mothers for the period 1972–2001 must be aggregated at the state and year levels.29
This aggregation is advantageous in our case because it allows us to control for
socioeconomic characteristics by merging the aggregated birth certificate data with
socioeconomic variables available in the March CPS for the period 1977–2001 (also
aggregated at the state and year levels).30 Moreover, births from all strongly treated
states are also aggregated as if they belonged to the same state with initial treatment in
the year 1985, the year the first strong mandate was enacted. Similarly, we aggregated
the data for the subset of comprehensive states (IL-MA-RI) with initial treatment in
the year 1987 when the first mandate was enacted in Massachusetts.31 The synthetic
control group is constructed as the convex combination of control states that are most
similar to the states with strong coverage and comprehensive coverage with respect
to various socioeconomic predictors as well as lagged values of the average age of
first motherhood before treatment (i.e., before 1985 and 1987, respectively). More
precisely, the predictors chosen include the following: (1) variables that control for
the demographic and family structure of the female population, such as the percentage
of new mothers older than 35 and the percentage of married women in the state; (2)
variables that control for the state’s race composition, such as percentage of white and
black females; (3) variables that control for the education level of the female popu-
lation, such as the percentage of highly educated women; (4) variables related to the
female labour market, such as the participation rate and employment rate, the average
logarithm of the hourly wage, and the percentage of women covered by Employment
Sponsored Insurance (ESI); (5) variables that control for differences in abortion laws
or attitudes, such as the abortion rate per 1000 women by state of residency; and (6)
28 These concerns have been raised in several studies (e.g., Heckman et al. 1997, 1998;Michalopoulos et al.
2004; Smith and Todd 2005), where it was argued that matching on observables alone would not guarantee
an adequate counterfactual because unobservables may affect the selection into treatment thereby leading to
bias in the estimation of treatment effects. Heckman et al. (1997, 1998) and Smith and Todd (2005) present
evidence that highlights the advantages of using a DID matching strategy, which allows for time-invariant
differences between the treatment and control groups. Michalopoulos et al. (2004) allows for selection into
treatment based on individual-specific unobserved linear trends.
29 Note that the synthetic control group methodology may not be used with individual-level data.
30 Note that the analysis allows one to rely on data covering different periods. Hence, we use data on the
average age of new mothers for the period 1972–2001 and exogenous characteristics, from the March CPS,
for the period 1977–2001. This implies that, before 1977, only the average age of first-time mothers in
different years was used as predictors, while after 1977 a richer set of predictors has been included.
31 To ensure our results are not driven by the assumption of the initiation of treatment in 1985 and 1987 for
strongly treated states and IL-MA-RI, respectively, we performed a simple but extreme robustness test that
consists of attributing the treatment year to the year the last state enacted the mandate. This implies that the
treatment year becomes 1991 for both the strongly treated and the comprehensive states. Because there are
states in both groups that passed their mandates before 1991, this would result in understating the effect
of the mandates (i.e., the estimated effect may be regarded as a lower bound). Our estimated effect is, as
expected, somewhat lower for all samples considered—ranging from 59 to 97%—but remains significantly
positive.
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several lags of average age at first birth.32 All of these predictors are averaged over
different periods to maximise the fit of the estimation. Although the predictors are
roughly the same for the four estimations (strong, strong whites only, IL-MA-RI, IL-
MA-RI whites only), the composition of the synthetic control group is not exactly
the same. It is always the case, however, that New Jersey is systematically the most
important state in the composition of the four synthetic control groups, representing
between 26 and 41 %, followed by Minnesota, whose contribution ranges between 11
and 17 % of the estimated synthetic control group.33
Table 4 presents the pre-treatment (i.e., before 1985) sample averages of all predic-
tors for the states with strong coverage (column 2), as well as for the synthetic control
group (column 3), and for the full group of control states (column 4). As shown, prior
to the passage of the first strong mandate to cover, new mothers in control states were
already younger than in stateswhere strongmandates to cover eventually passed. These
mothers also earned lower wages on average and, were less educated, more likely to be
married, less likely to have an abortion, less likely to participate in the labour market,
less likely to be employed and less likely to have employer-provided health insurance
coverage. The predictors’ pre-treatment values for the strongly treated states resemble
the pre-treatment values of the synthetic control group (column 3) much more than the
pre-treatment values for the full set of control states (column 4 ). Hence, the synthetic
control group should be a better counterfactual for the treated groups. Tables for the
white sample and for IL-MA-RI are similar but are not reported here in the interest of
brevity.
Our synthetic control estimate of the impact of the infertility coverage mandates on
the timing of the first child is the difference between the average age of new mothers
in states with strong mandates to cover (or the subset of IL-MA-RI) and the synthetic
control group at a given date. Panel A of Table 5 shows the estimates for the group
of states with strong mandates to cover, whereas Panel B shows the same estimates
for IL-MA-RI. The second column reports the synthetic control group estimate in
2001, that is, 16 and 10 years after the first and the last strong mandates were passed,
respectively. We refer to this estimate as the long-term effect of the mandates. For the
group of states with strong mandates, the long-term effect amounts to 0.266 and 0.317
years, approximately 3.2 months for all women and 3.8 months for white women,
respectively. For IL-MA-RI, the effects are larger despite the shorter period since
the first mandate: an increase of approximately 4.1–5.4 months in the average age
at first child for all and for white new mothers, respectively. The estimated long-
term effects of the mandates are considerable—between 15.7 and 18.8 % of the total
increase from 1985 to 2001 for the group with strong coverage and between 24.8 and
32 Other variables were considered as predictors but were discarded because they worsen the fit of the
model, i.e., they increased the root mean squared prediction error (rmspe) of the estimation, which is a
measure of the difference between the treated and the synthetic control group during the pre-treatment
period. These variables include, for example, the average number of children in the household, the split of
the female population’s age structure into 5-year age brackets, the percentage of females with private health
insurance, the percentage of first-deliveries in different 5-year age brackets, the average company size for
female workers, and the year of divorce reforms according to Friedberg (1998) and Gruber (2004).
33 Results for the composition of the four synthetic control groups are not reported for the sake of brevity
but are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 5 The long-run impact of strong infertility insurance coverage mandates on the age of new mothers
Synthetic control group estimates
Parameter estimate (2001) rmspe p value of rmspe ratio
Panel A: strong mandates
(1) All 0.266 0.0177 0.026∗∗
(2) Whites 0.317 0.0179 0.053∗
Panel B: Illinois, Massachusetts and Rhode Island
(3) All 0.341 0.0237 0.079∗
(4) Whites 0.448 0.0269 0.053∗
Treatment is assumed to start in 1985 for states with strong mandates and in 1987 for IL, MA and RI. rmspe
denotes the root mean squared prediction error. All the p values displayed are based on placebo runs that are
described in Sect. 4.2. The states that enacted strong mandates are: Arkansas (1987), Hawaii (1987), Illinois
(1991), Maryland (1985), Massachusetts (1987) and Rhode-Island (1989). Predictors used in estimation of
the synthetic control effect are described in Table 4 for the all women sample in strong mandated states.
For other samples, the tables were omitted for the sake of brevity but the set of predictors is the same.
Detailed tables are available in Machado and Sanz-de-Galdeano (2011). The composition of the synthetic
control group varies with the sample. Hence, in row (1) control states are Alaska, Arizona, District of
Columbia,Michigan,Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, Utah,
Vermont and Wisconsin. In row (2), control states are Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Michigan,
Minnesota,Nevada,New Jersey,NorthCarolina,Virginia,Washington,Wisconsin andWyoming. In row (3),
control states are Alabama, Alaska, District of Columbia, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey,
Utah, Vermont and Wyoming. In row (4), control states are Colorado, District of Columbia, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Utah, Vermont and Wyoming. Levels of statistical significance: ***
denotes significance at the 1-% level; ** at the 5-% level; and * at the 10-% level. The estimates in
this section were obtained using the October 2011 version of SYNTH, the Stata module to implement
synthetic control methods programmed by Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (see http://ideas.repec.org/
c/boc/bocode/s457334.html)
34.3 % for IL-MA-RI. The synthetic control estimates are slightly smaller than the
raw DID aggregate estimate, which amounts to approximately 0.42 years (5 months).
The third column of Table 5 shows the root mean squared prediction error (rmspe),
which is a measure of the difference in age at first birth between the treated and the
synthetic control group during the pre-treatment period. Hence, the lower the rmspe,
the better is our counterfactual. The rmspe values, displayed in column 3, are all small,
demonstrating the good fit of the models.
Inference in the synthetic control estimation method is often non-standard because
the number of non-treated units is typically small. However, as ADH argue in both
their 2010 and their 2014 papers, “by systematizing the process of estimating the
counterfactual of interest, the synthetic controlmethod enables researchers to conduct a
wide arrayof falsification exercises” or “placebo studies” that canbeused for inference.
We follow this approach and apply the synthetic control method to every potential
control state to create distributions of 38 placebo treatment effects and other statistics.
ADH recommend using the resulting distribution of the ratio post/pre-intervention
rmspevalues to construct a pvalue for this statistic. Thepvalue is constructedby simply
calculating the proportion of the estimated placebo ratios of post/pre-intervention
rmspe values that are greater than or equal to the ratio for the truly treated states. The
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Fig. 3 Average maternal age at first birth: treated vs. synthetic control groups
idea is that, in the absence of a treatment effect, the ratio of the post/pre-intervention
fit should be similar for treated and non-treated units. As the last column in Table 5
shows, the p values for the post/pre-intervention rmspe are all very small, implying
the existence of a statistically significant treatment effect for all four samples.
Figure 3 shows the annual average age at first birth in strongly treated states and in
IL-MA-RI comparedwith the synthetic control group counterpart for the sample period
(1972–2001) for all women and for white women. The synthetic control group does a
good job in tracking the pre-treatment evolution of new mothers’ ages in states with
strong coverage and in IL-MA-RI, which indicates we have a good approximation
to the counterfactual trend in maternal age at first birth that states with strong or
comprehensive coverage would have experienced had the mandates not been enacted.
It is worth noting the contrast with the evolution of all non-treated units used in Fig. 2b,
c, which has failed to track the treated states’ pattern as closely as the synthetic control
group has done. This result is not surprising, given the low rmspe values and the
closeness in terms of predictor values between the states with strong coverage and
their synthetic version shown in Table 4, for example.
More important than the size of the estimated long-term effect is its evolution over
time, which is shown in Fig. 4. Regressions of the estimated annual effects of the
17 post-treatment periods for the strong mandate states (and the 15 post-treatment
periods for IL-MA-RI) on indicators of time since the mandates (i.e., less than 5
years since the mandate, between 6 and 10 years, or more than 10 years), shown in
Table 6, confirm that the impact of the mandates grew significantly over time. Figure
4 and Table 6 are crucial because they demonstrate that the long-term cumulative
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Fig. 4 Gap between treated and synthetic groups for age at first birth
impact of the mandates on the timing of first births extends beyond its short-term non-
strategic impact on older women with infertility problems. The increasing impact of
the mandates together with the results from Sect. 4.1 constitute evidence of the delay
of motherhood. We believe that the mechanism operating here is simple; suppose no
supply constraints existed for infertility treatments when themandates were enacted. If
mandates had only a non-strategic effect on older women (i.e., ex-post moral hazard),
the estimated effect should therefore be positive but nearly constant over time. The
long-term effect may be larger than the short-term effect because, for example, women
whowere youngwhen themandates were enacted strategically delaymotherhood (i.e.,
exert ex-antemoral hazard). An alternative explanation for the increasing effectmay be
that supply constraints for fertility treatments existed when the mandates were enacted
but gradually disappeared due to technological improvements and/or price reductions,
giving access to a larger number of users of infertility treatments. Our analysis cannot
identify the exact contribution of each of these potential explanations to the increasing
effect of the mandates.34
34 We interpret an increase in the number of people who have insurance coverage as a decrease in prices
and, hence, as a supply shock. We thank an anonymous referee for this example. Another explanation for
the growing gap, noted by an anonymous referee, would be the following: suppose only highly educated
women delay motherhood irrespective of ART coverage. If the trend in the share of highly educated women
differed in the treated states relative to the synthetic control group, then a growing share of older women
would look for treatment in the treated states and the compositional effect would be long-lived. However, we
take into account the pre-treatment trend in the percentage of highly educated women in the construction of
the synthetic control group. Therefore, only major changes in the female educational trends after treatment
could cause a long-lived compositional effect.
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Table 6 Evolution of the synthetic control gap in maternal age at first birth. OLS estimates
Strong mandates IL, MA, RI
All Whites All Whites
Mandated coverage
1–5 years 0.093∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.048 0.095∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.029) (0.027)
6–10 years 0.158∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.041) (0.045)
More than 10 years 0.261∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.010) (0.017) (0.024)
F-test of joint significance [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001]
t-tests of equality
“1–5” vs. “6–10” coeff. [0.002] [0.036] [0.324] [0.163]
“6–10” vs. “more than 10” coeff. [<0.001] [<0.001] [0.0011] [0.0017]
“1–5” vs. “more than 10” coeff. [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001]
No. obs. 17 17 15 15
R2 0.982 0.980 0.881 0.924
The dependent variable is the post-treatment estimated gap of maternal age at first birth between states
with strong coverage and the synthetic control group. These variables correspond to those plotted in Fig. 4.
There are 17 post-treatment periods, corresponding to 1985–2001 for the strongly treated states and 15
post-treatment periods for IL-MA-RI, corresponding to the period 1987–2001. The synthetic control group
has different compositions depending on the sample used. Hence, for strong mandates “All”, the synthetic
control group is composed of: Alaska, Arizona, District of Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin. For strong mandates
”whites”, the synthetic control group is composed of: Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. For
IL-MA-RI ”All”, the synthetic control group is composed of: Alabama, Alaska, District of Columbia,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Utah, Vermont and Wyoming. For IL-MA-RI, “White”, the
synthetic control group is composed of: Colorado, District of Columbia, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, Utah, Vermont and Wyoming. Levels of statistical significance: *** denotes significance at
the 1-% level; ** at the 5-% level; and * at the 10-% level. p values corresponding to the F-tests of joint
significance and the one-sided t-tests of equality are displayed in square brackets. Robust standard errors
are displayed in round brackets. The model includes no constant
5 The effect of infertility treatment mandates on completed fertility
In the previous section, we presented evidence that infertility treatment mandates
induced ex-ante moral hazard leading women to delay motherhood. However, would
delaying motherhood necessarily result in a lower number of children per woman?
There are at least two elements that may operate in opposite directions. On the one
hand, by inducing delay, mandates may negatively affect the total number of preg-
nancies per woman; on the other hand, the higher probability of multiple births
amongst patients of infertility treatments may compensate for any negative effect
on the number of deliveries.35 In this section, we estimate the effect of infertil-
35 For example Gumus and Lee (2012) find that adoption decreases the number of ART cycles.
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ity insurance coverage mandates on the total number of biological children per
woman.
Figure 5 plots the average number of biological children over a woman’s reproduc-
tive life for two cohorts (women born between 1949–1952 and between 1954–1957)
in the control, strongly treated and comprehensive states (IL-MA-RI) using data from
the June CPS.36 When the first strong mandate was enacted in Maryland in 1985,
women in the older (younger) cohort were between 33–36 (28–31) years old. The
figure shows that women in strongly treated and comprehensively treated states have,
on average, a smaller number of biological children and do not catch up with women
in the control group by the age of 44. In our estimations below, we account for dif-
ferences in observable characteristics between treated and control states in two ways.
First, we control for covariates that may affect the trends shown in Fig. 5 . Second, we
restrict the control group in the estimation to states that have a positive weight in the
construction of the synthetic control group of Sect. 4.2.37
We estimate the effects of time passed since the mandates were enacted on the
total number of biological children using a zero-inflated Poisson regression for 44-
year-old women, i.e., women at the end of their reproductive lives, controlling for
36 In the June CPS, the number of biological children was obtained systematically only from women who
were 44-year-old or younger. Although some women have children beyond the age of 44, these women are
very few in number.
37 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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Table 7 The effect of infertility insurance mandates on the number of biological children
Strong coverage against MA-IL-RI against
Control states Synth states Control states Synth states
All Whites All Whites All Whites All Whites
Mandated coverage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1–5 years 0.133 0.120 0.117 0.139 0.114 0.129 0.151 0.203
(0.145) (0.119) (0.167) (0.120) (0.181) (0.150) (0.230) (0.265)
6–10 years −0.076 −0.078 −0.045 −0.052 −0.068 −0.124 −0.044 −0.068
(0.122) (0.136) (0.139) (0.137) (0.165) (0.164) (0.179) (0.172)
More than 10 years −0.047 −0.039 0.006 −0.009 −0.075 −0.086 −0.096 −0.144
(0.147) (0.146) (0.149) (0.159) (0.100) (0.088) (0.120) (0.138)
% of zeros 13.11 13.10 13.72 14.08 13.21 13.14 13.75 13.66
Vuong test p value <0.001 < 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Log-likelihood −15,322 −12,871 −7026 −5645 −14,557 −12,356 −5259 −4129
No. obs. 8609 7365 3966 3260 8163 7068 2938 2357
Marginal effects from zero-inflated Poisson. Sample years until 2000
Data from the June Marriage and Fertility Supplement of the Current Population Survey. Women aged
44 only. Sample years 1979–1985, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000. Control group in columns (3),
(4) and (7), (8) is restricted to states used to construct the Synthetic Control Group in Sect. 4.2. of the
paper. Hence, in col. (3) control states are Alaska, Arizona, District of Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin. In col.
(4), control states are Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. In col. (7), control states are Alabama,
Alaska, District of Columbia, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Utah, Vermont and Wyoming.
In col. (8), control states are Colorado, District of Columbia, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey,
Utah, Vermont and Wyoming. The control group in other columns includes all non-treated states i.e. states
where mandates were not enacted during the sample period. All models include year and state fixed effects
as well as educational attainment indicators, a binary variable indicating whether the woman works or not
and a unmarried dummy variable. Regressions for all women include race dummies as well. Levels of
statistical significance: *** denotes significance at the 1-% level, ** at the 5-% level, and * at the 10-%
level. Standard errors, displayed in round brackets, are clustered at the state level
individual characteristics.38 Table 7 shows the estimated marginal effects of time
since the mandates for sample years 1979–2000 (including Louisiana and New Jersey
in the control group as in the previous sections). The first four columns of Table 7
show the marginal effects for all strongly treated states, whereas the last four columns
show the marginal effects for IL-MA-RI. Each set of four columns is further split into
two groups of results. The first group is obtained from regressions in which the control
group is composed of all non-treated states (the first two columns); the second group
38 To further assess which model best suits our data, we compare the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC)
values of several models, namely Poisson, negative binomial, generalized Poisson, generalized negative
binomial, zero-inflated Poisson and zero-inflated negative binomial. The model with the lowest AIC value
both for thewhole sample and for the sample ofwhites is the zero-inflated Poisson. The zero-inflated Poisson
model allows for a different process for the zeros and accomodates excess frequency of zeros relative to the
Poisson model. The results with all models described above were qualitatively similar.
123
432 SERIEs (2015) 6:407–439
Table 8 The effect of infertility insurance mandates on the number of biological children
Strong coverage against MA-IL-RI against
Control states Synth states Control states Synth states
All Whites All Whites All Whites All Whites
Mandated coverage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1–5 years 0.1392 0.1285 0.1210 0.1372 0.1259 0.1190 0.1866 0.2185
(0.1298) (0.1175) (0.1461) (0.1250) (0.1631) (0.1405) (0.2013) (0.2135)
6–10 years −0.0808 −0.0871 −0.0948 −0.0595 −0.0670 −0.1272 −0.0530 −0.0761
(0.1166) (0.1318) (0.1411) (0.1440) (0.1558) (0.1550) (0.1927) (0.1915)
More than 10 years −0.0401 −0.0290 0.0142 −0.0066 −0.0438 −0.0847 −0.0587 −0.0318
(0.0906) (0.0814) (0.1079) (0.0851) (0.1054) (0.0891) (0.1163) (0.1088)
% of zeros 15.08 15.09 15.97 16.05 15.06 15.07 15.95 16.05
Vuong test p value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Log-likelihood −19,642 −16,470 −8597 −6917 −18,574 −15,802 −5743 −4584
No. obs. 11,335 9691 4978 4100 10,698 9274 3286 2673
Marginal effects from zero-inflated Poisson. Sample years until 2008
Data from the June Marriage and Fertility Supplement of the Current Population Survey. Women aged
44 only. Sample years 1979–1985, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008. Because
Louisiana andNewJerseywere treated in 2001, i.e. during the sample years,wedrop these two states from the
sample. The control group in columns (3), (4) and (7), (8) is restricted to states used to construct the Synthetic
Control Group in Sect. 4.2. of the paper, except for Louisiana and New Jersey. Hence, in col. (3) control
states are Alaska, Arizona, District of Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, North
Dakota, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin. In col. (4), control states are Arizona, Colorado,
District of Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and
Wyoming. In col. (7), control states are Alabama, Alaska, District of Columbia,Michigan,Minnesota, Utah,
Vermont andWyoming. In col. (8), control states are Colorado, District of Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota,
Utah, Vermont and Wyoming. The control group in other columns includes all non-treated states i.e. states
where mandates were not enacted during the sample period. All models include year and state fixed effects
as well as educational attainment indicators, a binary variable indicating whether the woman works or not
and a unmarried dummy variable. Regressions for all women include race dummies as well. Levels of
statistical significance: *** denotes significance at the 1-% level, ** at the 5-% level, and * at the 10-%
level. Standard errors, displayed in round brackets, are clustered at the state level
is obtained from regressions in which the control group is restricted to states used in
the construction of the synthetic control group of Sect. 4.2 (the last two columns). The
table shows the results for all women and white women separately. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level. Finally, the p-values of the Vuong test show that the
zero-inflated Poisson model is preferred (in all cases) to the Poisson model.
The relatively large positive impact in the first five years under the mandates,
although not statistically significant, plunges to negative values in the following years.
None of these effects statistically differs significantly from zero, however, due to their
large estimated standard errors. To improve efficiency, we replicate the estimation
by extending the sample up to 2008 (see Table 8).39 Consistent with the rest of the
39 Importantly, note that the dependent variable used in this section for complete fertility—i.e., ‘biological
children ever born’—is available from the June CPS until 2008, contrary to the case of ‘age at first child’
used in Sect. 4.1, which is only available until 1995.
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Table 9 The effect of infertility insurance mandates on the number of biological children
Strong coverage against MA-IL-RI against
Control states Synth states Control states Synth states
All Whites All Whites All Whites(a) All Whites
Quadratic evaluated at (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
5 years −0.0058 −0.0052 −0.0051 −0.0045 −0.0170∗ −0.0155 −0.0202∗∗ −0.0205∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0146) (0.0138) (0.0150) (0.0103) (0.0146) (0.0102) (0.0093)
10 years −0.0162 −0.0107 −0.0178 −0.0148 −0.0460 −0.0201 −0.0659 −0.0817
(0.0205) (0.0241) (0.0231) (0.0265) (0.0463) (0.0410) (0.0540) (0.0593)
15 years −0.0266 −0.0162 −0.0304 −0.0251 −0.0751 −0.0247 −0.1117 −0.1430
(0.0465) (0.0527) (0.0519) (0.0556) (0.1000) (0.0906) (0.1138) (0.1221)
Log-likelihood −15,325 −12,843 −7028 −5637 −14,558 −12,607 −5261 −4131
No. obs. 8609 7365 3966 3260 8163 7069 2938 2357
Quadratic polynomial specification. Marginal effects from zero-inflated Poisson. Sample years until 2000
Data from the June Marriage and Fertility Supplement of the Current Population Survey. Women aged 44
only. Sample years 1979–1985, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000. The control group in columns (3),
(4) and (7), (8) is restricted to states used to construct the Synthetic Control Group of Sect. 4.2 of the
paper. Hence, in col. (3) control states are Alaska, Arizona, District of Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin. In col.
(4), control states are Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. In col. (7), control states are Alabama,
Alaska, District of Columbia, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Utah, Vermont and Wyoming.
In col. (8), control states are Colorado, District of Columbia, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey,
Utah, Vermont and Wyoming. The control group in other columns includes all non-treated states i.e. states
where mandates were not enacted during the sample period. All models include year and state fixed effects
as well as educational attainment indicators, a binary variable indicating whether the woman works or not
and a unmarried dummy variable. Regressions for all women include race dummies as well. (a) means that
one state dummy was dropped from the inflated part of the model in order to achieve convergence. Levels
of statistical significance: *** denotes significance at the 1-% level, ** at the 5-% level, and * at the 10-%
level. Standard errors, displayed in round brackets, are clustered at the state level
paper, when presenting results using data until 2008, we exclude Louisiana and New
Jersey from the sample because these states enacted mandates in 2001. Results with
the sample years until 2008 remain qualitatively the same, and none of the marginal
effects of time since enactment are statistically significant.40,41
Conceivably, the large standard errors obtained in Tables 7 and 8 may result from
poor specification. We re-estimated the model using polynomials of the years since
enactment instead of the time intervals ‘1–5’, ‘6–10’, and ‘more than 10’ used in
Tables 7 and 8. Tables 9 and 10 show the results for the quadratic specification. The
log-likelihoodwith the quadratic specification is slightly worse than that obtainedwith
40 If we include New Jersey among the strongly treated states when using the data until 2008, we obtain
slightly larger effects, where the short-run effect of 1–5 years is marginally statistically significant at the
10 % level for the sample of whites only.
41 A linear model of the total number of biological children on year intervals since the mandates—i.e.,
‘1–5’, ‘6–10’ and ‘more than 10’—also produced non-statistically significant effects.
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Table 10 The effect of infertility insurance mandate on the number of biological children
Strong coverage against MA-IL-RI against
Control states Synth states Control states Synth states
All Whites All Whites All Whites All Whites
Quadratic evaluated at (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
5 years −0.0041 −0.0060 −0.0050 −0.0065 −0.0030 −0.0073 −0.0062 −0.0046
(0.0121) (0.0135) (0.0129) (0.0137) (0.0152) (0.0159) (0.0150) (0.0165)
10 years −0.0047 −0.0014 −0.0018 −0.0017 −0.0118∗∗∗ −0.0110∗∗ −0.0163∗∗ −0.0131
(0.0035) (0.0049) (0.0045) (0.0057) (0.0043) (0.0049) (0.0075) (0.0092)
15 years −0.0053 0.0031 0.0014 0.0031 −0.0205 −0.0147 −0.0264 −0.0215
(0.0141) (0.0167) (0.0128) (0.0181) (0.0215) (0.0218) (0.0252) (0.0295)
Log-likelihood −19,644 −16,471 −8599 −6918 −18,575 −15,803 −5742 −4585
No. obs. 11,335 9691 4978 4100 10,698 9274 3286 2673
Quadratic polynomial specification. Marginal effects from zero-inflated Poisson. Sample years until 2008
Data from the June Marriage and Fertility Supplement of the Current Population Survey. Women aged 44
only. Sample years 1979–1985, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008. Because
Louisiana and New Jersey were treated in 2001, i.e. during the sample years, we have dropped these
two states from the sample. The control group in columns (3), (4) and (7), (8) is restricted to states used to
construct the Synthetic Control Group in Sect. 4.2. of the paper, except for Louisiana andNew Jersey. Hence,
in col. (3) control states are Alaska, Arizona, District of Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, North
Carolina,NorthDakota, SouthCarolina,Utah,Vermont andWisconsin. In col. (4), control states areArizona,
Colorado, District of Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, Virginia, Washington,
Wisconsin and Wyoming. In col. (7), control states are Alabama, Alaska, District of Columbia, Michigan,
Minnesota, Utah, Vermont and Wyoming. In col. (8), control states are Colorado, District of Columbia,
Michigan, Minnesota, Utah, Vermont and Wyoming. The control group in other columns includes all non-
treated states i.e. states where mandates were not enacted during the sample period. All models include year
and state fixed effects as well as educational attainment indicators, a binary variable indicating whether the
woman works or not and a unmarried dummy variable. Regressions for all women include race dummies
as well. Levels of statistical significance: *** denotes significance at the 1-% level, ** at the 5-% level, and
* at the 10-% level. Standard errors, displayed in round brackets, are clustered at the state level
the time intervals, but the values are generally similar. The estimated marginal effects
at 5, 10 and 15 years after the mandates are small and statistically insignificant for
strongly treated states, with some statistically negative values for IL-MA-RI. Because
the quadratic specification has little flexibility to accommodate the ups and downs of
the marginal effects within the first few years, we re-estimate the model using a cubic
specification, not shown for the sake of brevity. The cubic specification, however,
produces marginal effects of the same order of magnitude, where even more terms
are statistically negative for the case of IL-MA-RI. Thus far, our results do not show
evidence of a positive effect of infertility treatment mandates on total fertility.
Finally, we estimated the effects of years since the mandates on total fertility con-
ditional on being a mother, i.e., we drop the zeros from the estimation. Table 11 shows
the marginal effects from a truncated Poisson regression for the sample up to 2000.
Not surprisingly, we find that the marginal effects on the intensive margin are smaller
in magnitude and also not statistically significantly different from zero.
Overall, the results show no statistically significant effect of either the strong or the
comprehensive mandates on completed fertility.
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Table 11 The effect of infertility insurance coverage mandates on the number of biological children
conditional on being a mother
Strong coverage against MA-IL-RI against
Control states Synth states Control states Synth states
All Whites All Whites All Whites All Whites
Mandated coverage
1–5 years 0.0650 0.0805 0.0577 0.0565 0.0870 0.0861 0.0950 0.0684
(0.1526) (0.1679) (0.1649) (0.1815) (0.1673) (0.1772) (0.1867) (0.2049)
6–10 years −0.0217 −0.0386 −0.0381 −0.0552 0.0290 −0.0639 0.0150 −0.0995
(0.1671) (0.1844) (0.1783) (0.1958) (0.2016) (0.2129) (0.2196) (0.2380)
More than 10 years 0.0751 −0.0271 0.0785 −0.0344 −0.0594 −0.0432 −0.1173 −0.1205
(0.2394) (0.2718) (0.2537) (0.2855) (0.3802) (0.3832) (0.4002) (0.4137)
Log-likelihood −12,286.5 −10,276.8 −5598.8 −4468.2 −11,660.3 −9888.4 −4197.7 −3315.9
No. obs. 7480 6400 3422 2801 7085 6139 2534 2035
Marginal effects from truncated Poisson model. Sample years until 2000
Data from the June Marriage and Fertility Supplement of the Current Population Survey. Women aged 44
only. Sample years 1979–1985, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2000. The control group in columns (3),
(4) and (7), (8) is restricted to states used to construct the Synthetic Control Group in Sect. 4.2. of the
paper. Hence, in col. (3) control states are Alaska, Arizona, District of Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin. In col.
(4), control states are Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. In col. (7), control states are Alabama,
Alaska, District of Columbia, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Utah, Vermont and Wyoming.
In col. (8), control states are Colorado, District of Columbia, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey,
Utah, Vermont and Wyoming. The control group in other columns includes all non-treated states i.e. states
where mandates were not enacted during the sample period. All models include year and state fixed effects
as well as educational attainment indicators, a binary variable indicating whether the woman works or not
and a unmarried dummy variable. Regressions for all women include race dummies as well. Levels of
statistical significance: *** denotes significance at the 1-% level, ** at the 5-% level, and * at the 10-%
level. Standard errors, displayed in round brackets, are clustered at the state level
6 Conclusions
In this paper we ask two questions about the impact of infertility treatment insurance
coverage on women’s fertility. First, does an increase in the coverage of infertility
treatments lead to greater delay ofmotherhood?Second, does the coverage of infertility
treatment increase completed fertility by the end of a woman’s reproductive life?
Variation in the timing of the enactment of infertility insurance mandates during the
late 1980s and early 1990s across the United States is exploited to answer the two
questions.
We focus our analysis on the effect of ‘strongmandates to cover’, whichwere passed
in six states in theUnitedStates (the treatment group):Arkansas (1987),Hawaii (1987),
Illinois (1991), Maryland (1985), Massachusetts (1987), and Rhode-Island (1989), as
well as on a subset of this group that enacted the most comprehensive mandates (Illi-
nois, Massachusetts, and Rhode-Island). Our analysis uses birth certificate data from
the National Vital Statistics, data from the March Annual Social and Economic Sup-
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plement of the Current Population Survey (March CPS), and data from the Marriage
and Fertility Supplement of the Current Population Survey (June CPS). Our results
indicate that, despite the fact that infertility insurance coverage has been shown to
increase birth rates among relatively older women as well as the prevalence of mul-
tiple births, strong or comprehensive mandates have no statistically significant and
positive effect on completed fertility. This is because infertility insurance mandates
also appear to delay motherhood among relatively younger women and hence make
conception more difficult due to the fact that fecundity decreases with age. In par-
ticular, we find evidence in favour of a behavioural response in the form of a delay
of motherhood in the states that have enacted strong and comprehensive mandates
both through a reduction of the probability of having a child by the age of 30 and
through an increasing effect of the mandates on the average age at first birth over time.
Therefore, our results suggest that the coverage of infertility treatments, which has
been considered a potential policy tool to increase European fertility rates, would not
contribute to a long-term increase in fertility.
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Appendix 1: Could the welfare reform explain our results?
Other potential causes may exist for the growing gap between treated and synthetic
states. For example, during the post-treatment years either treated or control states
may have enacted laws—e.g. welfare reform—that affected the mean age at first birth.
Welfare reform is likely to have discouraged maternity at younger ages through its
demanding work requirements and stringent eligibility standards for acceptance into
the assistance programs and, therefore, could have increased the mean age at first
birth.42 The welfare reform was enacted in 1996 [Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Act (PRWORA)] and became effective in July 1997, four years before
the end of our sample. Before that, however, some states had already introduced work
42 To our knowledge, no study has found that welfare reform increased the age of first motherhood. In fact,
Hao and Cherlin (2004) compare two cohorts of young women and conclude that welfare reform has not
decreased teenage fertility.
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requirements for welfare eligibility in the 1980s and early 1990s (Mead 2004). For the
interpretation of our analysis it is important to know the group (treatment, control, or
not in the sample) to which these early adopters of welfare reform belong. If some of
the treated states were early adopters of welfare reforms, then the present results would
likely overestimate the effects of strong infertility treatment mandates on the mean
age at first birth. In contrast, if early adopters constitute part of our synthetic group,
then the estimated gap in mean age at first birth between treated and synthetic states
would be underestimated. Reports show that early adopters [California, Colorado,
Iowa, Michigan, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Utah (see Mead 2004)]—with the exception
of California (which is neither a treated nor a control state)—are control states and,
thus if anything, we should expect a downward bias in our estimates of the effects of
the strong infertility treatment mandates on the average age at first birth.
Appendix 2: Changes in infertility treatment laws
Four out of the six strongly treated states (Arkansas, Hawaii, Maryland and Massa-
chusetts) revised their mandates during our sample period, i.e. before 2001. Table
12 briefly describes these revisions. The revisions in Arkansas and Maryland reduce
coverage and hence would tend to decrease the estimated impact of the original man-
dates. The 1995 revision in Massachusetts established that the IVF procedures ICSI
and ZIFT should be covered. ICSI is a particularly effective IVF procedure in cases of
male infertility in which a single sperm is injected directly into an egg. Because this
procedure was invented in 1991, it could not have been explicitly contemplated in the
original mandate, although the original Massachusetts mandate covered IVF proce-
dures. ICSI accounts for a large percentage of the fresh non-donor eggs or embryos,
according to CDC (2001). The usage of ZIFT, however, has been declining gradually
and in 2001 it accounted for less than 2% of ART procedures (CDC 2001). Finally, the
Hawaiian revision in 1995 is clearly an expansion of coverage to dependent unmar-
ried individuals. Simple DID estimates of the effect of this revision on the marriage
Table 12 Revisions of infertility treatment mandates
State Original mandate Revision Description of revisions
Arkansas 1987 1991 Imposition of minimum and maximum benefits and setting standards
Hawaii 1987 1995 Dependents of the insured are also covered
Maryland 1985 1994 Exempt businesses ≤50 employees from IVF coverage
2000 Restricts coverage to 3 IVF attempts/live birth
Exempts organizations with religious conflicts
Mass. 1987 1995 Extends coverage to ICSI and ZIFTa
Sources: Schmidt (2005b); https://www.hrtools.com/
http://us.firstvisitivf.org/display.asp?page=IVF_coverage_in_USA#state-law
http://www.resolve.org/
http://www.fertilitylifelines.com/payingfortreatment/state-mandatedinsurancelist.jsp
a For Massachusetts, see 1995-08 211 CMR 37.00, new infertility mandated benefits
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probability of first-time mothers show either no effect or a positive effect for whites.43
Hence, since there is no evidence that the Hawaiian revision decreased the marriage
rate in the state, it is unlikely that it had a significant impact on the number of covered
users.
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